Reports are made of each investigation. The report describes the investigation activities in general terms and contains the conclusions on the texts, activities or methods that could jeopardize the protection of the constitutional rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens, or the coordination and effectiveness of the services reviewed. The reports also contain recommendations to remedy any shortcomings. These reports are first sent to Parliament and the competent ministers. The Standing Committee I can decide to make all or part of its investigation reports public.

  • Review investigation into the actions taken by the intelligence services to detect the threat of interference by foreign powers through the financing of political parties, political institutions or political figures in Belgium [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Prescreenings conducted by State Security and GISS as part of recruitment procedures [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Investigation report on the way in which the Belgian intelligence services collect, deal with and analyze information on politicians and on the way they report to the competent authorities [pdf NL] [pdf FR]
  • Note on the intelligence services' information position on the risks inherent in the use of TikTok [pdf NL] [pdf FR]
  • Review investigation into the manner in which State Security monitored Imam Mohamed Tojgani [pdf NL] [pdf FR]
  • Legal analysis of the legal possibilities available to the two intelligence services in relation to disruption [pdf NL] [pdf FR]
  • Follow-up investigation into to recommendations on how intelligence and security services use the so-called 'special funds' [pdf NL] [pdf FR]
    Detailed note on information position on funding by foundations or other organisations and on Russia's influence on 'politicians' in Belgium [pdf NL] [pdf FR]
  • Note on financing of political parties and election campaigns in Belgium  [pdf NL] [pdf FR]
  • Note on ratification of Convention 108+: personal data protection options in the field of national security [pdf NL] [pdf FR]
  • The impact of foreign monitoring networks on Belgian intelligence services: the case of CRYTPO AG, RUBICON and MAXIMATOR [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Follow-up to the PRISM review investigation [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Review investigation into State Security foreign intelligence capabilities [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Review investigation into intelligence monitoring of philosophical organisations with political intentions contrary to democratic order [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Review investigation following revelations on use of PEGASUS software [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Review investigation into the follow-up of recommendations made in the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into Terrorist Attacks regarding the intelligence and security services
    [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Review investigation into the follow-up by Belgian intelligence and security services of detainees convicted of terrorism and/or radicalised, during and after their detention [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Review investigation into the monitoring by the intelligence services of the Muslim Brotherhood and of the possible threat they pose in Belgium [pdf FR] [pdf NL
  • Review investigation into the way in which State Security monitored the Government Commissioner Ihsane Haouach [pdf FR]  [pdf NL]
  • Review investigation into the detection and follow-up - by the two intelligence services - of the radicalisation of a soldier employed by the Ministry of Defence, and also into their cooperation with their partner services, including the Ministry of Defence, inter alia as regards their exchange of information [PDF FR] [PDF NL]
  • Follow-up of the recommendations formulated in the report on the monitoring audit of the CUTA supporting services with the exception of the police services and the intelligence services [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Review investigation into the supporting services of CUTA designated by the Royal Decree of 17 August 2018 (Joint investigation Standing Committee P - Standing Committee R) [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Review investigation into how the Belgian intelligence services communicate with a private or public employer about an employee [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Attention of the Belgian intelligence services on an employee of GISS and his relations with Russian citizens. Follow-up request [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Monitoring of harmful sectarian organizations and criminal organizations by State Security [pdf FR] [pdf NL]
  • Review investigation of the information available to the intelligence services regarding the death of Dag Hammarskjöld [pdf]
  • Review investigation of the information available to the intelligence services regarding the death of Dag Hammarskjöld – Final report [pdf]
  • Investigation report on the way in which the intelligence services monitor the threat emanating from the extreme right in Belgium today and report about it to the authorities. [pdf NL] [pdf FR]
  • In the context of the investigation on Edward Snowden’s revelations, the Standing Committee I called on external experts i.e. PhD Mathias Vermeulen (“Les révélations de Snowden, interception massive de données et espionnage politique. Etude des sources ouvertes”, 23 Oct. 2013) [here] and Prof. Annemie Schaus (“Consultation sur les règles en vigueur en Belgique en matière de protection de la vie privée eu égard aux moyens autorisant l’interception et l’exploitation à grande échelle de données relatives à des personnes, organisations, entreprises ou instances établies en Belgique ou qui ont un lien avec la Belgique”, 27 Nov. 2013) [here]. These expert reports were discussed on 12 March 2014 at the meeting with the senatorial Committee responsible for monitoring the Standing Committee I. They do not necessarily express the positions of the Standing Committee I.
  • Investigation report on the way in which the Belgian intelligence services collect, deal with and analyze information on politicians and on the way they report to the competent authorities [pdf]
  • Conclusions and recommendations of the investigation into the way in which the Belgian intelligence services consider the necessity of protecting the information systems against foreign interceptions and cyberattacks (2011) [pdf]
  • Investigation report on the way in which the Belgian intelligence services dealt with the phone-tapping incidents in the offices of delegations to the European Union Council in Brussels (2010) [pdf]
  • Investigation report on the way in which State Security and the GISS dealt with the case of the export of equipment to Iran (2009) [pdf]
  • Investigation report on a complaint lodged by a citizen regarding the interference by the State Security about him (2008) [pdf]
  • Investigation report on the way in which the intelligence services follow the activities of the Neonazis, and especially the selection and running of the informants in this context (2008) [pdf]
  • Investigation report on the potential follow-up by the intelligence services of the sale of a Belgian company to a foreign group (2008) [pdf]
  • Investigation report on the way in which the General Intelligence and Security Service has followed the election campaign in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the first semester of the year 2006 (2008) [pdf]
  • Investigation report on the so-called "reserved files" at State Security (2008) [pdf]
  • Report on the investigation into the monitoring of radical Islamism by the intelligence services (2007) [pdf]
  • Investigation on the way in which State Security performed its reviewing role with respect to Mrs F. Erdal (2006) [pdf]
 

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